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Abstract: Ulsan, South Korea is home to the world’s largest auto production complex and shipyard, and its second 
biggest petrochemicals combine. Drawing upon Jacobs’ Contextualized Model of Urban-Regional Development, this 
article shows how Ulsan’s growth path towards becoming one of the world’s Great Industrial Cities was decisively 
shaped by both global and nested factors. While the weights of the various tiers from the global to local have fluctuated 
over time, no one level has had primacy. Through Ulsan this study seeks to introduce the concept of Great Industrial City 
and in the process: 1) remind scholars and practitioners about the continued importance of industrial cities for national 
economies and in global capitalism; 2) demonstrate how the world’s city-regions have been decisively shaped by both 
international forces and embedded/nested factors; 3) enhance the English language reader’s knowledge of South Korean 
urban areas; and 4) encourage scholars to more seriously consider the manufacturing sector when classifying world cities 
and delineating the global urban hierarchy, and thereby, expand the global-nested city debate beyond merely the analyzing 
of large financial centers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Ulsan, South Korea is home to the world’s largest auto 
production complex and fifth largest automaker, its biggest 
shipyard and shipbuilder, and the globe’s second largest 
petrochemicals combine. In addition, these firms have export 
linkages on six continents. Yet, since it does not qualify as a 
center of international finance, the city never has been or will 
be ranked among the world’s most important cities by 
Global/World City theorists. Nevertheless, similar to other 
past and present Great Industrial Cities, such as Manchester, 
Essen, Detroit, Nagoya-Toyota, and Baoshan, Ulsan has 
become a vital cog in, and instrument of, global capitalism. 
 Great Industrial Cities are defined here as large, dense 
regional agglomerations of capital, labor, production, 
infrastructure, and knowledge, which provide substantial 
economies of scale and scope for firms in the same industrial 
sector (localization economies) and for firms in all industries 
(urbanization economies), and whose synergies incite an 
enlargement in the region’s output, population, employment, 
and income. As production expands, scale coupled within 
innovative processes ultimately provokes substantial export 
production. What distinguishes a Great Industrial City from 
other urban conurbations is that its industrial sector or 
sectors become(s) highly influential internationally, even 
dominant. What makes them significant is the fact that their 
industrial production has fostered employment and income 
expansion not only in their city-regions, but in their nations 
on the whole. 
 Ulsan’s rise to prominence in three industrial sectors 
suggests not only that is a Great Industrial City, but that it  
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merits much greater attention than the scant coverage it has 
received in the English language scholarly literature. 
Chronicling its success also is necessary, as it demonstrates 
the decisive role that embedded factors have continued to 
play in urban and regional growth trajectories. As Jacobs [1] 
suggested in his Contextualized Model of Urban-Regional 
Development, Ulsan’s growth path, similar to the world’s 
other major city-regions, industrial or non-industrial, has 
been driven by global, supranational regional, national, and 
sub-national factors. Ulsan’s development as a major 
manufacturing hub was facilitated by the policies of its 
national government. Its economy has remained heavily 
reliant on exports to other nations. Its growth context has 
been influenced by its nestedness within East Asia, including 
South Korea’s historical relations with Japan and North 
Korea, and the linkages of Ulsan firms with Japanese 
manufacturers. Finally, Ulsan has benefited from its sub-
national context, particularly from its substantial and 
internationally influential agglomerations of motor vehicles, 
shipbuilding, and petrochemicals related manufacturing 
firms, as well as its proximity to other industrial cities in its 
region. 
 Overall, this study through its case study of Ulsan, seeks 
to not only introduce the concept of Great Industrial City, 
but also to: 1) remind scholars and practitioners about the 
continued importance of industrial cities for national 
economies and in global capitalism; 2) demonstrate how the 
world’s city-regions have been decisively shaped by both 
international forces and embedded/nested factors; 3) enhance 
the English language reader’s knowledge of South Korean 
urban areas; and 4) encourage scholars to more seriously 
consider the manufacturing sector when classifying world 
cities and delineating the global urban hierarchy, and 
thereby, expand the global-nested city debate beyond merely 
the analyzing of large financial centers. As a result, this 
article should prove of interest to urban and regional scholars 
and practitioners from multiple disciplines. 
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THEORIES ON THE WORLD’S IMPORTANT CITIES 
 Numerous theories have been utilized by scholars to 
explain the growth trajectories of the world’s major cities. 
Perhaps the most heated and interesting debate has been that 
between Global and Nested City theorists. Among the most 
frequently cited advocates of the first and more well-known 
perspective have been Friedmann [2], King [3], Sassen [4], 
Smith & Timberlake [5], Knox & Taylor [6], and Taylor [7]. 
These scholars essentially have argued that contemporary 
capitalism has effectively disembedded cities from their 
nation-states, and thereafter, allowed transnational 
corporations (TNCs) to seize control over urban space and 
re-organize for their own purposes. The ensuing economic 
restructuring has provoked the creation of a new 
international division of labor (NIDL), a stratified world 
system with an urban hierarchy led by a few dominant core 
cities, New York, London, and Tokyo. 
 While variations and debates certainly have existed 
within this thesis, World/Global Cities scholars generally 
have agreed that the primary determinants driving growth 
outcomes in city-regions were: 1) the number of 
interconnections a city-region has; 2) which city-region it 
was affiliated with; and 3) in which economic sectors the 
city-region had international network linkages. Those city-
regions that have contained the greatest concentrations of 
financial and professional elites, and which have had the 
most interconnections with similar cities, have occupied to 
the top positions in the NIDL. From these ‘great cities,’ 
TNCs have reshaped other locations accordingly in the name 
of capital accumulation. Douglass [8] and Shin & 
Timberlake [9] have been among the few scholars who have 
drawn upon this perspective to discuss South Korean cities. 
 The second paradigm, Nested City theory, has argued 
that while it was true that global forces have become 
increasingly more influential, cities have followed their own 
unique development paths, decisively influenced by their 
particular embedded contexts (e.g., their geographic location, 
national intergovernmental systems, economic mix, local 
institutions, and social-demographics) [1, 10, 11]. In the case 
of South Korea, Markusen & Park [12, 13], Gallent [14], and 
Hassink [15] claimed that the State and not global flows has 
dictated urban industrial development in that nation. On the 
other hand, Hill & Kim [16], Y.S. Lee [17, 18], Jo [19, 20], 
Bae & Sellers [21], and Cho & Hassink [22] suggested that 
multiple-tiers of nestedness have influenced growth 
trajectories in South Korean cities, including national 
government policies, metropolitan factors, and their location 
in Northeast Asia,. Examples of the latter offered included 
Japan’s development of Seoul as its colonial financial-
administrative core and of Daegu as a textiles center; 
technical assistance provided by Japanese steelmakers to 
POSCO in Pohang; and the foreign direct investment of 
Japanese electronics firms in Masan-Changwon. 
 Although utilizing different theoretical approaches, W.B. 
Kim [23], B.G. Park [24-26] and Y.S. Lee’s [27] multi-scalar 
perspectives also suggested that contemporary urban 
economic growth in South Korea was now influenced by 
global, national, and local factors. Especially pertinent here 
was Park’s review of Renault’s takeover of the Busan-based 
Samsung Motors [24]. The conclusions of Multi-scalar and 
Nested city theorists were consistent with Jacobs’ [1, 11], 
Contextualized Model of Urban-Regional Development, 
which incorporates elements of several perspectives 
(including global, nested city, and agglomeration theory) in 
an attempt to explain the continued diversity of growth 
outcomes in the world’s city-regions. Jacobs recommends 
that scholars consider the dynamic interplay among 11 
contextual factors when examining the development patterns 
and status of the world’s major cities: 
1) Natural features - this factor accounts for the unique 
topographical features of an area, such as the 
existence of a deep harbor port, mineral deposits, and 
arable land; 
2) Time-historical - this variable considers the age of the 
city-region/when it first developed and its nation’s 
level of technological advancement; 
3) Scale - this refers to the size of city-region’s 
population and employment base; 
4) Position in national urban hierarchy - this element 
has two sub-factors. First, it stresses that every nation 
has its own urban hierarchy, some are diverse and 
complex, others contain a primate city, etc. Second, a 
national capital region within a given nation will have 
different nested context than that country’s non-
capital regions; 
5) Market-regional - this takes into account the region of 
the world in which a city is situated within, as well as 
its proximity to other urban areas within its nation-
state, in nearby nations, and worldwide; 
6) Economic-production - this factor considers a city-
region’s industrial mix, the diversity of its economic 
base, the existence of industrial agglomerations or 
other business or knowledge clusters, as well as an 
area’s physical infrastructure, and the degree and 
characteristics of its global economic integration (ex. 
the extent of its exports and imports); 
7) Social-demographics - this variable reflects upon an 
area’s racial-ethnic composition, its foreign-
born/immigrant population, inter-group relations, the 
level of educational attainment, labor skill, and any 
socio-cultural aspects that may impact development; 
8) Governmental structure - this element allows for 
national variations in governmental systems (e.g., 
unitary or federal), as well as in vertical and 
horizontal intergovernmental relations and their 
impact on a city-region; 
9) National development context - this factor considers 
the development approach of a city-region’s national 
government, such as liberal-regulatory vs 
developmental;  
10) Contemporary international events/forces - this factor 
accounts for the impacts of major global events, such 
as an economic crisis, war, currency fluctuations, and 
bilateral or multilateral trade disputes; and 
11) Institutional reflexiveness - this incorporates into the 
model the policy capacity/innovative skill of national 
and sub-national governments, as well as firms 
located in the area. It also considers local variations in 
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urban political economy, such as the existence of 
powerful growth machines or an anti-growth 
movement in the city-region [1, 11]. 
 Among the most relevant factors from Jacobs’ thesis 
which apply to Ulsan and which will be discussed shortly 
are: 1) its national development context and the Korean 
Developmental State ; 2) Contemporary International 
Events/Forces, particularly, the 1997 Asian Fiscal Crisis, 
trade disputes with the US and Canada, safety issues with 
Toyota cars, and the 2008 AIG-Lehman Shock; 3) its 
supranational regional context, specifically its historical and 
contemporary embeddedness in Northeast Asia; and 4) its 
sub-national context, including the city’s substantial 
industrial agglomerations and inter-firm linkages within its 
sub-region and adjacent sub-regions. 
 In sum, drawing upon Jacobs’ model, this article 
chronicles how Ulsan’s rise to Great Industry City status was 
shaped by both global and embedded factors. This discussion 
begins after a presentation of some basic background 
information on Ulsan. 
BACKGROUND ON ULSAN 
 Ulsan Metropolitan City is situated along the East Sea, 
within South Korea’s newly defined Dongnam (Southeast) 
Economic Zone and the larger Gyeongsang Region. As 
shown in Fig. (1), the latter also includes the Daegyeong 
 
Fig. (1). Ulsan among South Korea’s Provinces and Special Cities. 
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Economic Zone. Originally settled as a fishing port, Ulsan’s 
rise to industrial catalyst in its nation’s economic 
development began on January 27, 1962, when in 
accordance with the First National Five-Year Economic Plan 
or NEP (1962-66), and Cabinet Order 403, the area was 
designated as a Special Industrial District (SID). A few 
months later, on June 1, under National Law 108, Ulsan 
Township was authorized as a city (si). 
 Over the next 15 years the Ulsan-si’s population grew 
steadily, reaching 252,570 in 1975, before doubling to 
550,207 in 1985 [28]. Then, on 1 January 1995, after 
merging with Ulsan-gun (county) and adding roughly 
150,000 new residents, the city’s Census population rose to 
967,429. Two years later, Ulsan surpassed one million 
inhabitants and was authorized under National Law 5243, as 
the country’s sixth Gwangyeok-si or Metropolitan City. This 
designation placed it in South Korea’s second highest 
municipal status category, behind only the National Capital 
of Seoul [29]. It also granted it functional independence from 
its province, South Gyeongsang. With 1,126,879 residents 
within an area of 1,056 sq. km (408 sq. miles) in 2008, Ulsan 
was its nation’s seventh most populous city [30]. As shown 
in Table 1, the city’s population had increased by 114,769 or 
11.34% from 2000. 
Table 1. Change in Ulsan’s Population, Total & Manufacturing 
Employment, 2000-2008 
 
 2008 
Change 
2000-2008 
 % Change 
2000-2008 
Population (1) 1,126,879  114,769 11.34 % 
Households (1) 389,735 83,021 27.07 %  
Total Employment (1) 391,300 56,735 16.96 % 
Manufacturing Employment 146,481 17,670 13.72 % 
Sources: [28, 30]. 
Notes: (1) Estimates obtained from the sources. 
 
 As for employment, as again illustrated in Table 1, based 
upon the national enterprise census and local estimates, in 
2008 Ulsan establishments employed 391,000 workers. 
Among these, 146,481 were engaged in manufacturing 
production. These figures represented increases of 56,735 or 
16.96 % in total and 17,670 or 13.72 % in manufacturing 
employment from 2000. Whereas Ulsan’s total employment 
ranked seventh most among South Korean cities, its 
industrial employment was second. Moreover, as presented 
in Table 2, Ulsan’s post-2000 numeric increase in both 
manufacturing firms and industrial employment ranked first 
among the nation’s seven major cities. This was significant 
considering manufacturing employment expanded in only 
two of the seven during this period (See Table 2). 
 As for specific sectors, Ulsan has the unique distinction 
of being the home to the world’s: 1) largest automotive 
assembly complex and fifth biggest automaker, Hyundai 
Motor (HyMC); 2) largest dockyard and shipbuilder, 
Hyundai Heavy Industries (HyHI); 3) fourth largest producer 
of medium-sized container vessels, Hyundai Mipo Dockyard 
Co. (HyMD); and 4) second largest petrochemicals complex. 
It also hosted two of the globe’s top eight refineries, 
operated by SK Energy and S-Oil, which combined to 
process more crude oil daily, 1.4 million barrels in 2010, 
than any other city on earth [31]. As a result, Ulsan ranked 
first among South Korean cities in employment in four 
manufacturing sectors: Motor Vehicles, Motor Vehicles 
Parts & Trailers (MVM); ‘Other’ Transportation Equipment 
Manufacturing (OTEM), including shipbuilding; Chemicals 
& Chemical Products; and Coke & Refined Petroleum 
Products (See Table 3). 
 More specifically, in 2008 Ulsan’s 410 Transportation 
Equipment Manufacturing (TEM) firms employed 91,819 
workers, 49,378 in MVM, and 42,441 in OTEM (See Table 
3). In all, TEM employment had increased by 19,518 of 
27.00% from 2000, and accounted for 62.68% of the city’s 
total manufacturing employment in 2008. In addition, these 
sectors were supported by 440 firms employing 24,519 in 
related complementary manufacturing, for another 16.74% 
of the city’s industrial workers. Although the Chemicals & 
Chemical Products sector lost 5,110 jobs or 29.94% between 
2000 and 2008, the city’s 169 Petrochemicals and Non-
metallic Mineral firms still employed 17,889 workers in the 
latter year, including 11,955 in Chemicals. 
Table 2. Manufacturing Employment Change: Metropolitan Cities & Seoul, 2000-2008
 (1, 2)
 
 
City 
Change in  
Manufacturing 
Firms 
2000-2008 
Change in  
Manufacturing  
Employment 
2000-2008 
% Change in  
Manufacturing 
Firms 
2000-2008 
% Change in  
Manufacturing  
Employment 
2000-2008 
GDP  
Per Capita 
2008 
Seoul - 1,480 - 49,684 - 22.21% - 27.66% $23,375 
Busan - 269 - 23,826 - 6.51% - 15.54% $15,360 
Daegu - 124 - 15,150 - 4.10% - 13.93% $12,975 
Incheon - 49 - 22,623 - 1.08% - 12.47% $17,460 
Gwangju 254 14,097 33.42% 33.67% $14,790 
Daejeon 60 - 768 9.63% - 2.34% $15,075 
Ulsan 325 17,670 35.79% 13.72% $46,370 
Korea 7,311 143,358 14.29% 6.20 % $20,210 
Source: [28]. 
Notes (1) Employment is by Place of Work. 
(2) GDP were rounded at the source and calculated using the July 1, 2008 exchange rate of 1,048.11 KRW to USD. 
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 Finally, all of Ulsan’s manufacturing sectors were 
tremendously supported by the city’s extensive port system, 
whose four harbors annually handled: 1) approximately 16% 
of South Korea’s cargo tonnage; 2) more than 50% of the 
nation’s crude oil imports; 3) almost 50% of the country's 
automobile exports; and 4) more than 40% of South Korea’s 
shipbuilding exports [30, 32]. In concert with the city’s 
industrial prowess, the port system has helped transform 
Ulsan into Asia’s fourth largest manufacturing hub in terms 
of value of exports, and into a major catalyst in South 
Korea’s economic growth over the past 35 years. Although 
not a focus of this article, the city’s dense clustering of heavy 
and chemical factories unfortunately also have made the city 
infamous for its combative management-labor relations and 
its environmental pollution [33]. Nonetheless, similar to its 
positive achievements, these negative externalities were 
fostered by a combination of global and nested factors. 
INTERNATIONAL AND NESTED FACTORS DRI-
VING ULSAN’S RISE TO ‘GREAT’ INDUSTRIAL 
CITY 
 The next sections utilize some of the international, 
national, and sub-national factors suggested by Jacobs [1] in 
his Contextualized Model of Urban-Regional Development, 
to show how Ulsan’s multi-layered nestedness has helped 
transform it into a Great Industrial City. 
A. National Development Context and the Korean 
Developmental State 
 Drawing upon embedded autonomy theorists, such as 
Evans [34], Hill & Kim [16], Jacobs [11] claimed that 
variations in national development context helped to explain 
the continued diversity in city-region growth trajectories. In 
light of its liberalization efforts since the 1990s, some 
scholars have questioned the continued effectiveness of the 
South Korea’s state-led developmental approach [35-37]. 
Nonetheless, there is no disputing that the national 
government was the foremost catalyst driving Ulsan’s rise to 
Great Industrial City status. 
 As mentioned, the origins of Ulsan as an industrial 
powerhouse began in 1962, when under the First NEP of 
military leader Chung-Hee Park (1961-79), the area was 
designated as a SID and the base for South Korea’s oil and 
chemicals industries [33, 38]. This decision was consistent 
with one of the primary goals of the plan: to end the nation’s 
total reliance upon imported chemicals and fertilizers. To 
promote growth in its new target areas and sectors, the 
government encouraged firms to build facilities within SIDs, 
by offering them sizeable tax exemptions/credits, low 
interest loans, utility-rate subsidies, and tariff rebates on 
import goods utilized to create exports [39, 40]. In addition, 
in 1962, the national government established the Korea 
Petroleum Energy Corporation (KPEC) in Ulsan, which two 
years later would open the nation’s first oil refinery [41]. 
 Unfortunately, while the plan’s policies led to the 
establishment of a major petrochemicals complex in Ulsan in 
1967, and fostered rapid growth in manufacturing 
employment, the leading petrochemical producers in the city 
were primarily foreign companies involved in joint ventures 
with local firms [42]. In response, government policies 
evolving from its Second NEP (1967-71) specifically 
targeted capital-intensive investment in chemicals, as well as 
in steel and machinery manufacturing [39, 43]. 
 Next, in 1970, in an effort to relieve over-crowding and 
congestion in Seoul and Busan, the government again 
Table 3. Ulsan’s Manufacturing Employment by Sector, 2008 
(1)
 
 
 
2008 
Establishments 
2008 
Manufacturing 
Employment 
 % of 2008 
Manufacturing 
Employment 
Employment 
Change 
2000-2008 
Total Manufacturing Employment (KIC 10~33) 1,233  146,481 100.00% 17,670  
Transport Equipment Manufacturing (2) 410 91,819 62.68% 19,518 
--Motor Vehicles, Motor Vehicle Parts & Trailers (2) 220 49,378 33.71% 12,555 
--Other Transport Equipment, including Shipbuilding (2) 190 42,441 28.97% 6,963 
TEM-related Complementary Manufacturing 440 24,519 16.74% 5,134 
Fabricated Metals 180 7,926 5.41% 1,212 
Machinery & Equipment 164 7,823 5.34% 4,278 
Primary Metals  62 6,094 4.16% 513 
Plastics & Rubber Products  34 2,676 1.83% -869 
Petrochemicals & Non-metallic Minerals  169 17,889 12.21% -5,222 
Chemicals & Chemical Products (2) 118 11,955 8.16% -5,110 
Coke & Refined Petroleum Products (2) 20 5,069 3.46% 179 
Non-metallic Mineral Products  31 865 0.59% -291 
Other Manufacturing 214 12,254 8.37% -1,760 
Source: [28]. 
Notes: 
(1) Employment is by Place of Work. 
(2) Ulsan ranked first nationally in employment in this category. 
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provided firms tax incentives to relocate factories to Ulsan 
and other designated SIDs [44]. These initiatives were 
accelerated under the Third NEP (1972-76), which came to 
be known as the Heavy Chemical Industrialization Plan (HCI 
Plan), which sought to turn South Korea into a world leader 
in petrochemicals manufacturing. According to Leipziger & 
Petri [45], this strategy “was implemented through directed, 
subsidized credit, selective protection, regulations affecting 
industrial entry, and direct government involvement in 
industrial decision making.” To lead this HCI drive, in 1974-
75, the government designated four new growth poles: 
Yeocheon (now Yeosu, for petrochemicals); Changwon 
(machinery, especially for defense industries); Pohang (iron 
and steel); and Ulsan (chemicals, automobiles and 
shipbuilding). Thereafter, in 1982, Onsan (petrochemicals), 
at the time just outside of the Ulsan city limits in Ulsan-gun, 
was established [12, 44]. 
 As a direct result, “by 1973 an independent Korean 
chemical complex [had] emerged in Ulsan… [and with it], 
the nation’s dependence on imports of synthetic fiber for its 
textiles industry nearly disappeared” [42]. Moreover, the 
number of petrochemical plants in the city had increased 
from just two in 1963 to 51 in 1978 [38, 44]. Finally, the 
HCI Plan laid the foundation for the expansion of KPEC’s 
oil operations in Ulsan. Purchased by SK Energy in 1980, 
this complex would ultimately become the world's second 
largest single refinery and the centerpiece of a network 
which currently extends into 14 countries on five continents. 
Through SK Gas, which established its first liquefied gas 
plant in Ulsan in 1985, SK became South Korea’s largest gas 
station operator; the firm currently possesses a 34% domestic 
market share while operating 3,670 stations, nationwide [41]. 
 As for other prominent industries in Ulsan, in 1962-63, in 
conjunction with the First NEP import-substitution and 
export-oriented goals, the government enacted the 
Automobile Industry Promotion Law and the Automobile 
Protection Act. These measures eventually led to Hyundai 
opening a vehicle manufacturing plant in Ulsan in 1968, 
where it assembled a small lot of complete knock down 
(CKD) cars for Ford Motor Company [17, 46, 47]. Shortly 
thereafter, Hyundai’s chances for success changed 
dramatically positive, when the early 1970s, the national 
government set out to build its own MVM industry [39, 42, 
44, 48]. 
 In accordance with the HCI Plan, in 1975 the South 
Korean Government passed the Enterprises Affiliation 
Promotion Law, which encouraged and subsidized the 
clustering of auto parts and components makers. One of the 
prime focus areas for an auto cluster was the newly designed 
growth pole of Ulsan. Next, under the Fourth NEP (1977-
81), the government targeted the automotive industry as a 
strategic industry for export promotion, and extended special 
subsidies to suppliers and subcontractors affiliated with 
domestic manufacturers [49]. As a result, by December 
1975, when the first Pony rolled off the HyMC’s Ulsan 
assembly line, South Korea was producing its own cars. 
Within a year, HyMC exported the nation’s first car from 
Ulsan. In addition, by the late-1970s, 90% of the parts in the 
typical Korean car were domestically manufactured [42]. 
 During the 1980s, buoyed by HyMC’s Excel sub-
compact, export production expanded significantly in Ulsan. 
These efforts were greatly enhanced by the national 
government’s passage of the Automobile Industry 
Rationalization Policy in 1981, which protected the domestic 
auto industry by limiting passenger car manufacturing to two 
companies: HyMC and GM-Daewoo’s Saehan Motors [46]. 
Over the next 15 years, this and other national policies, such 
as currency interventions, preferential tax and credit 
incentives, and periodic crackdowns on labor/the relaxation 
of labor laws, combined with other factors to be discussed, 
transformed HyMC into a major international automaker 
[35]. 
 In 1996, annual vehicle production at the firm’s Ulsan 
complex had exceeded one million vehicles. Then, in 1998, 
in the midst of the 1997 Asian fiscal crisis, which left the 
auto industry, among others, in financial peril, HyMC 
absorbed the nation’s second largest automaker, Kia Motors. 
By the end of the 2000s, the Hyundai-Kia brands had 
rebounded from the crisis and commanded a roughly 70% 
share of the domestic market. At that time, domestic vehicles 
production stood at 2.74 million, export sales had exceeded 
one million, and HyMC’s total vehicle production had 
soared to 4.65 million [50-52]. Meanwhile, the firm’s Ulsan 
operations had been transformed into the world’s largest 
assembly complex, a 5.05 square kilometers site (54.35 
million square feet) containing five independent plants, with 
a vehicle capacity of 1.7 million vehicles and employing 
34,000 people. By 2010, as a direct result of its national 
developmental approach, the former CKD assembler based 
in Ulsan had become the world’s fifth largest automobile 
producer [52]. 
 National plans and policies introduced during the 1960s 
and 1970s also were vital to Ulsan’s rise to top of the global 
shipbuilding industry. In order to create a private domestic 
shipbuilding industry, the government introduced the 1962 
Shipbuilding Industry Encouragement Act, again offering 
direct subsidies (up to 30% of the production costs to build 
local shipyards), “duty-free imports on parts and materials 
[and] loans to companies replacing old ships” [43]. Under 
the Second and Third NEP, two more Shipbuilding 
Promotion Acts were enacted (in 1967 and 1973), as well as 
the Machinery Promotion Act (1969). Together, supported 
by the Korea’s Export-Import Bank, this legislation extended 
subsidies and favorable financing to domestic shipbuilders 
and parts suppliers. 
 Similar to HyMC, HyHI’s success also was greatly aided 
by the national political connections of its founding family 
and its business conglomerate, the Hyundai Jaebeol or 
chaebol, extending as high up as President Park. For 
example, for much of the past 50 years, a disproportionate 
proportion of high-ranking national officials have hailed 
from South Gyeongsang Province. This included Mong-Jun 
Jeong, then president of HyHI and son of Hyundai’s founder 
Ju-Yeong Jeong, who was elected to the national assembly in 
1988 representing Ulsan [24, 53]. These linkages netted 
HyHI countless government contracts to construct ships, 
national infrastructure, and industrial facilities projects. It 
was within this context that HyHI broke ground on its 
massive shipbuilding operations along Ulsan’s Mipo Bay in 
1972, and was granted a special national policy exception 
allowing it to secure technical assistance from foreign 
shipbuilders. As a result, by the mid-1980s, the firm had 
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become the world’s largest shipbuilder, employing as many 
as 30,000 workers at its Ulsan dockyard [43, 46, 48]. By 
2010, HyHI held a 15% share of the world shipbuilding 
market and had offices and subsidiaries in 22 countries on 
five continents. Moreover, its Ulsan-based affiliate, HMD, 
had become among the top four producers of mid-sized 
container vessels [54]. 
 In sum, as Dicken [55] wrote in reference to the auto 
industry, but which also applies to the petrochemicals and 
shipbuilding industries: “The US, Japanese, and European 
automobile companies exert such market dominance that 
there have been virtually no new entrants to the industry 
during the past 30 years. The major exception is South 
Korea, which emerged in a space of just a few years as a 
significant international force, directly as a result of state 
involvement.” While global liberalism may have loosened its 
grip over its economy, the South Korean Developmental 
State led Ulsan’s rise to Great Industrial City status. This 
involvement continued in 2010, when national government 
Korean State provided 27 billion Korean Won (KRW or 
$25.76 million) to construct the Ulsan Free Trade Zone, on a 
1.30 square kilometers site (13.97 million square feet) in the 
city’s Ulju-gu’s Sin-Il General Industrial Complex [32]. 
B. International Forces Impacting Ulsan’s Growth Path 
 Influenced by Dicken and others, Jacobs claimed that the 
more integrated into the world economy a city’s firms were, 
the greater the frequency and magnitude it was impacted by 
international events. As a result of their export orientation of 
its major manufacturing firms, Ulsan’s fate certainly has 
been tightly linked to the global economy. Examples of 
international factors which have significantly affected the 
city’s growth path have included the: 1) 1997 Asian Fiscal 
Crisis; 2) friction caused by South Korean trade surpluses 
with the US and Canada; 3) Toyota’s 2010 safety issues with 
its US vehicles; and 4) low KRW relative to the Japanese 
Yen (JPY) of the late-2000s, especially following the AIG-
Lehman Shock of September 15-16, 2008.  
 Among the many impacts of the 1997 Asian Fiscal Crisis 
was the dramatic depreciation of the Korean Won (KRW), 
which forced the South Korean Government to turn to the 
IMF for aid, and left the nation’s largest jaebeol in fiscal 
distress [53, 55]. In response, the government promulgated 
its Big Deal Program, which set out to rationalize the 
nation’s energy, electronics, and TEM sectors by 
encouraging the restructuring of, and business swaps among, 
the jaebeol [40]. This was a mixed blessing for Ulsan’s 
Hyundai Group. On the one hand, it was placed instructed by 
the government to become more focused on its heavy 
industries and shipbuilding operations by divesting itself of 
some of its assets. On the other hand, in 1998, HyMC was 
allowed to take over the failing Kia Motors. This gave the 
firm the economies of scale and financial stability needed to 
invest heavily vehicle quality. This accelerated its move 
away from “being merely a low-price regional producer of 
cars primarily for Asian markets,” to a company whose 
Ulsan exports comprised a significant and rising share of 
North American and European auto sales [55]. 
 Finally, the Asian Fiscal Crisis led to the election of a 
more democratic national government and later, the rapid 
decentralization of political power in South Korea. While 
both would prove advantageous to the society in the long-
run, the new government’s attempts at economic 
liberalization and labor reform, most dictated by the terms of 
the IMF bailout, ultimately provoked a geographic shift in 
HyMC’s production. As a result, while Ulsan’s plants 
remained the core of HyMC’s worldwide manufacturing 
activities, by 2009 it produced only about 30% of its vehicles 
in the city, as compared with twice that in 2000 [50]. In 
2011, Hyundai-Kia vehicles were built in 22 countries on 
five continents. This included 16 group-owned final 
assembly complexes situated in eight nations, and 24 CKD 
operations in 17 countries. Among Hyundai-Kia plants, 10 
plants were overseas and the rest located in six separate 
South Korean municipalities. The newest facility was 
HyMC’s St. Petersburg, Russia plant, which opened in 
September 2010. The group, which was expected to open its 
11th overseas factory in Sao Paulo Brazil in 2012, now has 
subsidiaries and sales affiliates in nearly 200 countries [51, 
52, 56]. 
 As for trade issues, during the 1980s, relations with 
North American were frayed due to South Korea’s large 
trade surpluses with the US and Canada, particularly related 
to imported automobiles. According to Bello & Rosenfeld 
[35], nearly 40% of South Korea’s “$6.5 billion trade surplus 
with US in 1988 was… accounted for by its exports of 
automobiles and auto parts,” Leading the charge was HyMC 
and its best-selling Ulsan-built subcompact, the Excel. At 
that time, HyMC also threatened with of import quotas from 
Canada [47]. 
 Within this context, and after receiving $131 million in 
incentives from the Canadian and Quebec governments, 
HyMC constructed a $387 million plant just 45 minutes east 
of Montreal, in Bromont, QC. With an annual capacity of 
100,000 vehicles, it began producing Sonatas there in April 
1989, under the assumption that the new factory “would 
enable it to get into the North American market on a far 
larger scale than was possible by shipping [cars] from 
Ulsan” [46]. Despite these major investments, constant 
quality problems doomed Bromont production from the start, 
and the plant was shuttered in 1993. 
 Over the next decade, this lesson taught HyMC that any 
successful entry into North American required major 
improvements to quality. As mentioned, aided by its merger 
with Kia, this was accomplished during the 2000s, when 
North America sales from Ulsan roughly doubled to 450,000 
vehicles. Meanwhile, a significantly expanding trade surplus 
with the US served to reignite friction between the two 
countries. In response, HyMC decided to once again produce 
cars in North America, this time constructing a 
manufacturing complex in Montgomery, Alabama in 2005, 
with an annual capacity of 300,000 vehicles; in 2010, the 
plant produced 300,500 vehicles with a domestic content of 
80% [50, 52]. Then, in November 2009, it began production 
at a Kia factory in West Point, Georgia, just 90 miles 
northeast of Montgomery, equally capable of manufacturing 
300,000 vehicles annually [51]. It also was considering re-
opening its Bromont plant in 2011. In contrast, the group cut 
back on its vehicle exports from Ulsan, where production 
was basically flat during the 2000s. 
 HyMC’s new U.S factories also proved fortuitous in the 
light of a third international event, a barrage of damaging 
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news stories in early 2010 and the subsequent US 
Congressional hearings alleging safety issues with Toyota 
Motor’s most popular vehicle models (i.e., sudden 
acceleration). As a direct result, US vehicle sales of the 
Hyundai-Kia Group rose by 21.7% to 894,496 in 2010 as 
compared with 2009 [57]. While very little of this increase 
was from exports, Ulsan-based auto suppliers benefited 
tremendously from a related rise in demand for parts 
installed in the firm’s increasingly popular American-made 
models; sales of the Hyundai Sonata sedan rose by 63.8% 
from 2009 to 196,623 [57]. Perhaps unfortunate for the city 
however, was HyMC’s decision to shift some of its Elantra 
subcompact model production from Ulsan to Alabama, 
beginning in November 2010. 
 A final dramatic global factor affecting Ulsan 
employment was the depreciation of the KRW during the 
late-2000s, relative to the currency of its major export 
competitors the JPY. This trend began in January 2008 and 
accelerated rapidly following the September 15-16, 2008 
collapse of two giant US financial services firms, AIG and 
Lehman Brothers. Fig. (2) illustrates how relatively ‘low’ 
against the JPY the KRW has become, by comparing annual 
exchange rates between 1997 and 2010. Since the KRW 
essentially has an extra digit below cents (i.e., 1000 KRW = 
100 JPY), to normalize the two rates to 1.000, the KRW rate 
per 10 JPY was used. In the chart, a reading below 1.000 
signified that the KRW’s value was ‘low’ relative to the 
JPY, favoring Ulsan exporters. Conversely, a ratio of greater 
than above 1.000 meant that the KRW was ‘high’ vs the 
JPY, favoring Japanese exporters. 
 As shown in Fig. (2), after fluctuating around par or 
1.000 between December 31, 2001 and December 31, 2004,  
 
the KRW appreciated against the JPY. It then returned to its 
2004 level just before the AIG-Lehman Shock, after which, 
in the weeks to follow, international investors aggressively 
sold off KRW and USD and bought JPY. This led to the 
concurrent rapid rise in the JPY against the USD and an 
equally dramatic fall in the KRW. These combined events 
resulted in the KRW being even cheaper against the JPY 
(.719) on October 31, 2010, than it was at the height of the 
1997 Asian Fiscal crisis (see December 31, 1997, when it 
was at .775). 
 This situation created a significant pricing advantage for 
Ulsan exporters over their Japanese competitors, which was 
enhanced by two factors: 1) in the late-2000s, Ulsan 
manufacturers were much less dependent on Japanese 
imports as compared in 1997; 2) during the Asian Fiscal 
Crisis, the JPY also dramatically depreciated against the 
USD, resulting in equivalent KRW to JPY rates against the 
USD rather than a ‘low’ KRW (Again, see Fig. 2). One 
outcome of this was, despite HyMC’s new US plants, Ulsan 
city manufacturing employment expanded by 17.11% or 
6,201 jobs between 2007 and 2008. Approximately 94% of 
this was in MVM and OTEM, each of which added more 
than 2,200 workers. A similar expansion was expected for 
2009-10 based upon an even lower KRW [58]. 
 In sum, the Asian Fiscal Crisis, trade friction with North 
America, the Toyota vehicle recalls of 2010, and the AIG-
Lehman Shock/’low’ KRW vs the JPY, all demonstrate how 
Ulsan’s growth cycles, similar to that of other Great 
Industrial Cities, have been forcefully shaped by 
international political-economic forces. By the same token, 
with firm linkages on six continents, South Korea’s 
industrial heartland has become an important node in global 
capitalism. 
 
Notes. Since the KRW is denominated in 1,000 to the USD as compared with 100 Yen, the figures above were 
adjusted or normalized by utilizing the KRW to 10 JPY rate. In other words, if the JPY to KRW was .1000, it was 
represented above as 1.000. Therefore, a figure of < 1.0 meant that the KRW was ‘low’ relative to the JPY, while > 1.0 
meant the KRW was ‘high’. 
Fig. (2). KRW to JPY Normalized Exchange Rates, 1997-2010. 
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C. Ulsan’s Supranational Embeddedness in Northeast 
Asia 
 Drawing especially upon Hill & Fujita [10], Jacobs [1] 
contended that the region of the world an urban region was 
situated within uniquely influenced its growth path. South 
Korea is located in Northeast Asia, on a peninsula just 120 
miles across the Korean Strait from Japan. To its north is 
North Korea, itself bordered by China, to its northwest, and 
Russia, to its northeast. Historically, this geographical 
embeddedness has placed the nation, as well as its cities and 
firms, in the middle of some precarious and advantageous 
political-economic circumstances. For example, for most of 
the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910), Korea was on friendly terms 
with Japan and was a protectorate of China. Conversely, 
from 1910 to 1945, Korea was a colony of Imperial Japan. 
This marked a period of severe repression and exploitation 
of its people that the two nations have yet to overcome. 
 In addition to political and territorial ramifications, 
Japanese colonization also had a lasting effect on South 
Korea’s economic and industrial development. Initially, 
Japan dismantled Korea’s feudal class divisions and its 
prohibitions on private property ownership established 
during the 1,000 year Yi dynasty. Moreover, it constructed 
the energy, transportation, financial, and commercial 
infrastructure necessary to modernize and industrialize the 
country. Nevertheless, such endeavors were not part of a 
strategy to make Korea self-sufficient, but rather to support 
Japan’s empire building. This was especially apparent 
following Japan’s annexation of Manchuria in the 1931, 
when Korea became a frontline supply base for its military 
advances in China. It also was evident with regards to 
Japanese investments in Korean education, which although 
high, were not intended to build a thriving middle class, but 
rather to assimilate Koreans at the bottom of Japanese 
society. Finally, following a bloody uprising in 1919, the 
Japanese purposefully cultivated a Korean capitalist class in 
order to quiet the masses. This bourgeois class would later 
resurface as the political, economic, and social elites of post-
colonial South Korea [42, 59-62]. 
 Following its defeat in World War II (WW II), Japan 
withdrew from Korea in 1945, resulting in its partitioning 
into the present-day North and South Koreas. Only five years 
later, the nation was thrust into the middle of an ideological-
based war (1950-53) between capitalism (aided by America) 
and socialism (supported by Chinese and the USSR). When 
peace was restored, the civil economy of South Korea’s 
economy became concentrated in textiles and light 
manufacturing, led by a small number of large companies 
run by members of the aforementioned Japanese-fostered 
colonial elite, operating out of formerly Japanese plants [60]. 
 The influence of Japan continued after General Park 
seized power via a military coup in May 1961. Although 
fervently nationalistic, the new President was inspired most 
by the strategies of Japan’s late-19th Century Meiji 
Government, especially its ‘rich nation, strong army’ 
doctrine, which called for the cultivation of a loyal business 
class. As a result, members of the bourgeoisie were jailed 
and their fortunes commandeered, only to be released and 
their wealth returned, if they committed to invest in the best 
interest of economic nationalism [60, 62]. This set the stage 
for the formation of the South Korean jaebeol, such as 
Hyundai, whose size and diversification mirrored that of 
Japan’s pre-war zaibatsu business conglomerates. Park’s 
NEP and ambitious export-oriented strategy, which rapidly 
pushed South Korea’s industrial mix toward HCI, also were 
inspired by Japan’s pre- and post-WW II success. Park 
picked Ulsan to play a key role in this drive because of its 
deep harbor, vacant land, and most importantly, similar to 
the other districts developed in the nation’s southeast, its 
location, because it was as far away as possible on the 
peninsula from North Korea. 
 Park’s ‘Look East’ policy also re-established linkages 
with Japanese companies, a decision which proved 
particularly beneficial for Ulsan’s post-1960s economic 
growth [11, 42, 48, 63]. For example, the Ulsan-based HyHI 
and HyMC owe much of their success to the tutelage of the 
Japanese firms, particularly, Kawasaki Heavy Industries 
(KHI) and Mitsubishi Motors (MMC), respectively. As part 
of this technical assistance, KHI invited 200 Korean 
engineers and technicians to Japan for training, provided 
HyHI with proven designs for ships, and subcontracted with 
the firm to build its first two tankers [48]. As for the HyMC, 
since 1973, it has received financial and technical support 
and has been involved in several joint ventures with MMC. 
HyMC’s first Pony models were built with MMC engines 
and transmissions. In 1982, MMC purchased a 10% stake in 
HyMC, with the latter agreeing to produce about 30,000 cars 
annually using the Mitsubishi Precis nameplate. Later, this 
partnership made it possible for HyMC to begin exports of 
its Excels to Canada in 1984, then to the US in 1986, and to 
the opening of HyMC’s Bromont, Quebec plant in 1989 [35, 
49, 64]. 
 Based upon a MMC design, between 1992 and 1998 the 
two firms jointly made the Hyundai Grandeur, “the best 
known, domestically manufactured, luxury car in South 
Korea;” the car essentially was a Mitsubishi 
Debonair produced in Ulsan with a Hyundai badge [63]. 
After 1998, the Grandeur became solely a Hyundai 
production, but was succeeded by the Ulsan-built Hyundai 
Equus, briefly sold in Japan as the Mitsubishi Dignity 
limousine, and then by the Hyundai Dynasty/Mitsubishi 
Proudia [52]. Modeled originally on its Gallant platform, 
between 1988 and 1998 MMC also supplied engineering and 
core components (imported or licensed) to the Hyundai 
Sonata, at the time, built in Ulsan. MMC’s equity holdings in 
the firm remained around 15% during this period, before 
declining through 2003, when it sold off its remaining 
HyMC shares. Until September 2009, when bought out by 
their partner Chrysler, the two firms still jointly developed 
engines for their Gallant and Sonata models, among others, 
through their Global Engine Manufacturing Alliance [52, 
64]. 
 Finally, technology transfer and guidance from Japanese 
steel, machinery, and auto and shipbuilding parts suppliers, 
also have greatly contributed to employment growth in 
related plants in Ulsan [48, 63]. POSCO, the world’s third 
largest steelmaker in 2010, and a main supplier to HyHI and 
HyMC for roughly 40 years, was the most prominent 
example of this. The firm initially was a turnkey operation of 
Nippon Steel, constructed primarily with parts produced, and 
with staff trained, in Japan. In sum, Ulsan’s historical and 
more recent linkages with Japan demonstrate how its post-
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war growth trajectory has been deeply embedded within 
Northeast Asia. 
D. Ulsan’s Sub-national Agglomerations and Inter-local 
Linkages to Growth 
 Melding Alfred Marshall [65] and Jane Jacobs’ [66] 
conclusions regarding industrial districts with Isard [67], and 
Scott & Storper’s [68] claims related to regional 
agglomerations, Jacobs [1, 22] maintained that collaboration, 
among firms and among municipalities within the same 
geographic region, can have a positive effect on a city’s 
growth trajectory [69]. As a Great Industrial City, Ulsan is a 
prime example of an area whose industrial firms have greatly 
benefitted not only from national government policies and 
international linkages, but from its nestedness within two 
regional industrial agglomerations: the Dongnam Economic 
Zone and the larger Gyeongsang Region. The latter 
encompassed Dongnam, and the newly designated national 
economic bloc to its north, the Daegyeong Economic Zone 
(Again, see Fig. 1). 
 As previously shown in Tables 1 and 3, in 2008, Ulsan 
was a Metropolitan City of 1.13 million people and 391,000 
in total employment. Whereas, these both ranked seventh 
nationally among cities, its manufacturing employment of 
146,481, stood second. The latter included a clustering of 
410 TEM firms employing 91,819, supported by another 440 
firms with 24,519 workers in the complementary industries 
of Fabricated Metals, Machinery & Equipment, Primary 
Metals, and Plastics & Rubber Products manufacturing [28, 
32]. All combined, these firms, in concert with those in 
Petrochemicals & Non-metallic Minerals and the city’s 
extensive port facilities, have formed “a horizontally 
integrated industrial system” in Ulsan, which has been a 
significant catalyst driving South Korea’s economic growth 
over the past 35 years. 
 Yet, while Ulsan itself qualifies as a regional industrial 
agglomeration, its firms also have been dependent upon 
linkages with businesses dispersed among municipalities within 
its larger economic zone and region. As of 2008, the Dongnam 
Economic Zone, which encompassed the Metropolitan Cities of 
Ulsan and Busan, plus the localities in South Gyeongsang 
Province, had an estimated 7.93 million residents, 2.54 million 
in total employment, and 11,346 manufacturing establishments 
employing 590,643 workers (See Table 4 and Fig. 1). Among 
the latter were 1,921 firms employing 212,444 in TEM. This 
included 918 establishments and 85,483 workers in MVM, and 
1,003 and 126,961, respectively, in OTEM. These firms were 
complemented by 5,464 Metals and Machinery companies with 
209,826 in employment. 
 The economic zone’s largest city was Busan, with 3.57 
million residents and 1.15 million in employment, both 
second most nationally. It also contained 129,500 
manufacturing jobs, including a Renault Samsung auto 
factory. Following Busan and Ulsan was Changwon, a city 
in South Gyeongsang Province which following its July 1, 
2010 merger with Masan and Jinhae had a population of 1.08 
million. The new unified city was a core for machinery and 
fabricated metals production, and home to GM-Daewoo and 
Ssangyong Motors engine plants [28, 32, 70]. 
 Finally, Ulsan’s TEM cluster also has been aided by 
complementary manufacturing firms within the Daegyeong 
Economic Zone, which encompassed Daegu Metropolitan 
City and the municipalities in North Gyeongsang Province. 
In total, Daegyeong had an estimated 5.17 million in 
population and approximately 1.52 million in employment in 
2008, of which 306,285 were in manufacturing (Again, see 
Table 4). Especially relevant for Ulsan factories were the 
clusters of: automotive parts plants in Gyeongju city; 
fabricated metals and parts suppliers in Daegu; machinery 
makers in Gyeongnan city; and most of all, the previously 
mentioned POSCO complex in Pohang, a city of more than 
500,000, located 70 km (44 miles) north of Ulsan. For nearly 
40 years a significant share of POSCO’s Pohang output has 
been sent to HyMC and HyHI’s Ulsan plants. So intertwined 
have been these firms that in July 2010, HyHI, HyMD and 
POSCO deepened their long-held cross-shareholdings ties. 
Moreover, just two months later, POSCO opened a large 
new mill in Alabama to serve HyMC and its suppliers in the 
emerging US Southern Automotive Corridor. 
 As a result its numerous agglomeration/production 
synergies, Ulsan’s total value of exports of $78.8 billion in 
2008, ranked first among South Korea’s seven special cities; 
its figure was equivalent to 18.7% of the nation’s total [71, 
Table 4. 2008 Population and Employment for Ulsan and its Surrounding Area
(1, 2)
 
 
 Population
 
Total Employment
 
Manufacturing Employment Manufacturing Firms 
DONGNAM ECONOMIC ZONE 7,926,474 2,541,340 590,643 11,346 
-Ulsan Metropolitan City 1,126,879 391,300 146,481 1,233 
-Busan Metropolitan City (3) 3,574,340 1,150,000 129,500 3,865 
-South Gyeongsang Province 3,225,255 1,000,000 314,662 6,284 
---Changwon city (4) 1,080,441 NA NA NA 
DAEGYEONG ECONOMIC ZONE 5,167,449 1,520,000 306,285 6,874 
-North Gyeongsang Province 2,654,845 800,000 212,686 3,973 
-Daegu Metropolitan City 2,512,604 720,000 93,599 2,901 
Sources and Notes: 
(1) Population and Total Employment estimates from city and provincial sources [30, 70, 76, 77]. 
(2) Employment is by place of work. Manufacturing Employment obtained from KOSIS [28] National Data. 
(3) Busan population for 2009. 
(4) Population is for July 1, 2010, and is the total of the merged cities of Changwon, Masan and Jinhae. 
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72]. In addition, as presented in Table 2, at 48.6 million 
KRW ($46,370 US), it had the highest GDP per capita 
among these cities, a figure that was more than twice the 
national average [28, 73]. Next, Ulsan’s agglomeration 
economy has allowed it to maintain a strong employment 
and industrial base, despite economic downturns and other 
dramatic world events during the 2000s. 
 As previously shown in Tables 1-3, between 2000 and 
2008, the city added 56,735 in total employment, along with 
325 industrial firms and 17,670 in manufacturing 
employment, both again tops among the seven special cities. 
This was noteworthy considering that during this period 
industrial employment contracted in five of the seven, with 
four suffering net losses in their manufacturing firms. 
Finally, industrial expansion has fueled both population and 
income growth in Ulsan. The city’s population rose by 
114,769 during the 2000s, and its per capita income 
expanded to 15.3 million KRW ($14.598) in 2008. The latter 
ranked second highest among special cities, and trailed only 
the national capital, Seoul, by a mere $191 [28, 73]. 
 Overall, along with the other influences previously 
chronicled, Ulsan’s nestedness within the Dongnam Economic 
Zone and the Gyeongsang Region has been a decisive factor 
shaping its transformation into a world-connected, Great 
Industrial City, Asia’s fourth largest manufacturing hub in terms 
of value of exports, with firm linkages on six continents. The 
city government has established several new initiatives to help 
maintain this status, specifically aimed at building upon and 
strengthening its international competitiveness in MVM. This 
has included: the construction of seven new industrial/research 
& development parks as part of its Auto Valley Project; and a 
September 2010 agreement with Samsung SDI and others 
establishing a ‘Battery Industry Promotion Council,’ aimed at 
nurturing the development of a battery industry in Ulsan [32]. A 
final industrial park focusing upon advanced chemicals 
production was schedule to open sometime in 2011. This park 
hopes to complement the city’s petrochemical industries, which 
in 2009 already ranked fifth worldwide in total volume of 
ethylene produced, as well as manufactured two-thirds of the 
nation’s export volume in this sector [32, 74]. 
 Unfortunately, Ulsan’s dense clustering of heavy and 
chemical industries also has resulted in it becoming its nation’s 
most polluted city. For example, before its rehabilitation in the 
1990s, the level of contaminants in its Taehwa River prompted 
national observers to dub it: ‘the River of Death’ [75]. In 
addition, the growing international reputations of its firms, 
particularly HyMC and HyHI, frequently aided by the 
government, have fostered highly combative management-labor 
relations, and have led to South Korean annual working hours 
ranking among the highest for OECD countries. Nonetheless, 
similar to its positive achievements, these negative outcomes 
were facilitated by global forces and the city’s supranational, 
national, and sub-national historical and political-economic 
nestedness. 
CONCLUSION: LESSONS FOR/FROM ‘GREAT” 
INDUSTRIAL CITIES 
  This article began by claiming that Ulsan, as a result of it 
being the home to the world’s largest shipyard and 
shipbuilder, its biggest auto production complex, its fifth 
largest auto producer, and one of its largest petrochemical 
complexes, qualified as a Great Industrial City (i.e., one of 
the world’s major and influential industrial agglomerations). 
Second, drawing upon Jacobs’ [1] Contextualized Model of 
Urban-Regional Development, it showed how Ulsan’s path 
toward Great Industrial City status was decisively shaped by 
both global forces and embedded factors. While the weight 
of each scale has fluctuated over time, both have been vitally 
important. 
 In the process, it sought to not only to introduce the 
concept of Great Industrial City, but also to: 1) remind 
scholars and practitioners about the continued importance of 
industrial cities for national economies and in global 
capitalism; 2) demonstrate how the world’s city-regions have 
been decisively shaped by both international forces and 
embedded/nested factors; 3) enhance the English language 
reader’s knowledge of South Korean urban areas;  
4) encourage scholars to more seriously consider the 
manufacturing sector when classifying world cities and 
delineating the global urban hierarchy, and thereby, expand 
the global-nested city debate beyond merely the analyzing of 
large financial centers.  
 As suggested by Jacobs’ [1] model and others, Ulsan, 
similar to all modern Great Industrial Cities, such as Toyota 
City, Stuttgart, Detroit, Sheffield, and Baoshan, has been 
significantly supported by the policies of its national 
government. In the case of Ulsan, the interventional Korean 
Developmental State, with its NEP, industrial district 
location decisions, and strategic targeting of specific 
manufacturing sectors, among other policies, was the 
foremost catalyst steering its growth path. However, like the 
others cities previously mentioned, international forces also 
were highly influential. For Ulsan, the Asian Fiscal Crisis of 
1997, trade friction between South Korea and North 
America, the AIG-Lehman Shock of 2008, and the Toyota 
safety recalls of 2010 were examples of such factors. 
Moreover, its prosperity was heavily reliant upon the export 
of manufactured goods to other nations within an ever 
expanding global economy. 
 Next, Ulsan’s growth trajectory was dramatically shaped 
by its location within East Asia, where South Korea’s 
historical relations with Japan and North Korea, and 
connections between Ulsan local industries and Japanese 
firms, among other factors, have been crucial. The same 
could be said for Great Industrial Cities situated in North 
America, Western Europe, Southeast Asia, etc. Finally, 
similar to that of Detroit, Toyota City, and the others, Ulsan 
has benefited from its sub-national context, particularly its 
dense agglomeration of MVM, shipbuilders, petrochemical 
producers, and related supplier firms, its extensive port 
system, and linkages with complementary establishments 
located in other municipalities within the Dongnam 
Economic Zone and the larger Gyeongsang Region. 
 In sum, consistent with Jacobs’ model, global, 
supranational regional, national, and sub-national contextual 
factors have combined to transform Ulsan from a fishing 
port into one of the world’s Great Industrial Cities, Asia’s 
fourth largest in terms of value of exports, with firm linkages 
on six continents. Most importantly, its industrial growth has 
driven employment and income growth not only in the city, 
but also in its region and nation on the whole. As such, 
Ulsan’s rise demonstrates the continued importance of 
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studying industrial cities. It hopefully also encourages other 
English-language scholars to more closely examine South 
Korean city-regions. 
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